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 1 
 
Rethinking Transnational Solidarity in the EU 
 
Jonathan P. J. White 
Perspectives: the Central European Review of International Affairs 20 (2003), pp.40-57. 
 
Abstract 
 
Most contemporary analysis of popular attitudes in the European Union 
takes identity as the explanatory idea, and posits a hierarchy of 
totalising identities – national, supranational, regional and so forth.  
This ‘horizontal’ approach has arguably resulted in unproductive debate 
concerning the normative basis on which the Union’s future should be 
built.  More useful is to focus on how popular attitudes differ according 
to different areas of transnational concern.  This paper seeks to outline a 
theoretical framework for such a ‘vertical’ approach, and to sketch its 
application using the environmental and judicial fields as case-studies. 
 
 
 
Horizontal and Vertical Modes of Analysis 
There are at least two perspectives from which one can consider popular feelings of 
solidarity towards others.
1
   One is to posit a coherence in people’s attitudes across a 
range of different issues and to define this perspective as ‘identity’. Discussions of 
national identity, European identity, regional identity and the like all make the basic 
assumption that there is a certain unity to people’s beliefs, that, for example, the way 
people view issues as diverse as immigration, foreign policy or development aid is a 
function of whatever overarching identities they ascribe to themselves.  This emphasis on 
broad identities – albeit none of them exclusive, and often considered in a hierarchical 
relationship (‘Catalan first, European second, Spanish third’, for example) – can be 
described as the horizontal approach to popular feelings of solidarity. 
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 A second approach rejects this cross-issue coherence and argues that the way 
people regard others depends considerably on the particular problem at hand.  So, for 
example, an inhabitant of Barcelona may feel a high degree of solidarity towards 
strangers in environmental matters (advocating, for example, emergency financial aid to 
flood victims in Central Europe), but may be hostile to the prospect of an open-door 
migration policy that gives outsiders equal job opportunities to locals. To interpret his 
attitudes with reference to horizontal identities (‘how European does the man feel?’) is of 
little explanatory worth, for his loyalties are issue-specific.  This approach, which 
emphasises the discrepancies between popular feelings of solidarity from one issue-area 
to the next, can be described as the vertical approach. 
 In most discussions of the European Union it is the first of these two approaches 
that is taken.  This is visible in various contexts, notably in the public discourse to be 
found in the Convention on the Future of Europe.  Consider the latest draft text for the 
Treaty establishing an EU constitution (June 2003): the Preamble runs ‘convinced that, 
while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe 
are determined to transcend their ancient divisions, and, united ever more closely, to 
forge a common destiny’, it talks of Europe being ‘united in its diversity’, and in Article 
I-5(1) states firmly that ‘the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member 
States.’2  The goal is clearly seen as both reconciling and preserving a series of deep-
seated identities, and the implication is that the citizens of Europe should constitute an 
amalgam of ‘European values’ and ‘national essence’.  It is a tiered, horizontal approach. 
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 3 
 One finds similar assumptions in the research that the European Commission 
undertakes to investigate the attitudes of its citizens.  One of the questions regularly 
asked in its Eurobarometer opinion polls is as follows: ‘In the near future do you see 
yourself as: a) (respondent’s nationality) only; b) (respondent’s nationality) and 
European; c) European and (respondent’s nationality), or d) European only?’3  Even 
though the question clearly allows for some degree of complex interaction between plural 
identities, nonetheless it is a series of monolithic identities which is suggested, and these 
existing in an abstract decontextualised fashion (‘in the near future’). 
 This is also the approach taken by the majority of academic scholars.  
Representative is a piece by Henrik Lesaar titled ‘Semper Idem?  The Relationship of 
European and National Identities’ – in itself a suggestive title.  Lesaar notes different 
layers of identity (town / village, region, country, Europe), emphasises that popular 
attachments may change over time, and towards the end of his piece acknowledges the 
importance of context in determining when certain loyalties are prioritised over others.
4
  
But despite this emphasis on the shifting nature of the hierarchy, the assumption of a 
series of horizontal, monolithic identities persists.  
 There is a clear problem however with this horizontal approach to popular 
attitudes.  It projects a coherence onto its subject matter, a unity of purpose, the existence 
of which is unverifiable. Individual expressions of transnational loyalty are likely to be 
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read anachronistically as indications of a ‘European identity’ when in fact they may be 
highly contingent; similarly, expressions of scepticism are likely to be noted as 
indications of ‘persistent nationalism’ when in fact their explanation may be more 
complex.  In the policy-making field meanwhile, the result can be the rather redundant 
debates which feature prominently in discussion of the EU’s future.  Arguably the most 
fundamental flaw in debating whether to base ‘European identity’ on cultural-historical 
similitude or on shared values (‘civic nationalism’ or ‘constitutional patriotism’) is the 
fact that both approaches expect the individual to be ‘systematic’ in his identity, to be 
able to declare in some abstract sense what it is that he is or that he stands for.
5
   
Clifford Geertz provides an appropriate warning of the inadequacies of such an 
approach in his essay ‘The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the 
Century’: ‘In cultural terms,’ he writes, ‘as in political, ‘Europe’ say, or ‘Russia’, or 
‘Vienna’ must be understood not as a unity of spirit and value, set off against other such 
supposed unities – the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, the United States, or 
London – but as a conglomerate of differences, deep, radical, and resistant to summary.’  
With regard to the terminology of ‘identity’, ‘values’, and ‘nation’ he argues that ‘what 
we need, it seems, are not enormous ideas, nor the abandonment of synthesising notions 
altogether.  What we need are ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to 
individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities, responsive to what 
Charles Taylor has called “deep diversity”, a plurality of ways of belonging and being, 
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and that yet can draw from them – from it – a sense of connectedness, a connectedness 
that is neither comprehensive nor uniform, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless real.’6 
In the paper that follows, it will be argued that popular feelings of solidarity in the 
EU are best studied by moving away from the horizontal approach that has been 
described and by focusing instead on the loyalties that are held with regard to particular 
issues and in the face of particular problems.  Such a shift in focus is particularly apposite 
in the context of the institutional-reform process initiated by the Nice Summit, since 
arguably Europe’s system of governance will work best if it is designed to be responsive 
to the pluralistic attitudes of its citizens rather than if it assumes (or seeks to create) an 
identity which describes them in their entirety. 
Immediately it should be noted that some basic things can nonetheless be said 
about identities in the horizontal sense.  It is a frequent and credible claim made by 
various studies of popular perceptions in the EU that a North-South divide exists with 
regard to how citizens understand the essence of the Union and their place within it.  
According to the OPTEM report ‘Perceptions of the European Union’ (2001), 
populations such as the British, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish, and amongst the accession 
countries also the Czechs and Estonians, are said to feel a considerably weaker 
attachment to their fellow Europeans than those in other parts of Central Europe and the 
Mediterranean, who hold a much stronger sense of shared culture and humanistic values.  
Such differences can be seen as grounded in historical experience – it is those populations 
with a collective memory of living side-by-side as subjects of a larger empire (be it 
                                                          
6
 C. Geertz, ‘The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century’, in Available Light, 
pp.221-4. 
 6 
Roman, Byzantine, Habsburg or Napoleonic) that tend to be, at some basic level, the 
most Europhilic.
7
  
But the significance of historical experience and this associated ‘sense of 
belonging’ (as the OPTEM study refers to it) should not be overstated. Firstly, as the 
study points out, ‘the feeling of closeness or distance between European nations may, of 
course, vary over time.’8  It is responsive to events.  This implies that, amongst the 
factors that influence popular attitudes on particular issues at any given time, an inherited 
general ‘sense of belonging’ is only one.  Normative standpoints may also, therefore, 
differ according to the subject in hand – hence the possibility of wider loyalties on 
environmental questions than on immigration issues.  Indeed, whilst on some issues the 
adoption of such standpoints may be unavoidable (e.g. these two above-mentioned issues, 
also issues of competing jurisdiction, of social legislation and consumer protection), in 
other more technocratic areas of EU politics there may be considerably less scope for 
their development (in transport-related issues for example). Jacques Delors’ comment 
that ‘you don’t fall in love with an internal market without borders’ can be read as a 
recognition that the development of transnational solidarity in the EU generally is 
dependent upon the potential of individual policy-areas to generate a normative 
response.
9
 
 
 In shifting focus from a horizontal to a vertical approach, the introduction of new 
descriptive terminology is likely to be necessary.  Those currently-existing theoretical 
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 7 
frameworks which do adopt a pluralistic understanding of identity tend to focus on elite 
attitudes, and to extend their terminology to EU citizens generally would seem 
problematic, given the lack of an organisational structure from which individuals can be 
said to derive roles and rules of behaviour.
10
  A tentatively sketched conceptual 
framework for investigating mass attitudes might look as follows: expressions of loyalties 
(collectively termed normative discourse) are looked for in the statements (explicit or 
implicit) made by a group or individual which indicate the size of the social group whose 
welfare it prioritises over others.  These loyalties, as suggested, are investigated with 
regard to particular issue-areas (e.g. environmental security) known as normative 
discursive domains.  The normative discourse in some of these domains is expected to be 
more transnationally extensive than in others (i.e. transnational loyalties are strong in 
some issue-areas, weaker in others), and individuals are presumed to participate in 
multiple domains according to their spheres of interest and activity.  A community is 
defined loosely as the stage reached when there is a high level of consistency between the 
normative discursive domains (i.e. when loyalties are equally wide and inclusive on a 
range of issues).  Community in this sense could be likened to the often-mentioned 
‘European demos’, but would be understood as a political ideal towards which progress 
was by no means clear. 
 With the problem defined in these terms, the relevant questions to be tackled (and 
only some of them will be investigated here) are likely to be these: which are the domains 
in which transnational loyalties are most extensive; who participates in them (i.e. in what 
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activity-areas do social groups seem to situate themselves in an EU-wide normative 
context, and which social groups in particular seem most willing to do this); how do these 
domains seem to be developing over time, and to what extent should one link the 
development of these domains to growing interdependence between populations?
11
  How 
does discourse in one domain seem to affect discourse in another?  And is there any 
overall inter-domain coherence emerging (i.e. is a Community or demos really in 
prospect)? 
 
Loyalties and the European Union 
An exploration of people’s normative standpoints requires illuminating their hierarchy of 
value preferences.  How large is the group whose welfare they prioritise over others?  If 
loyalties are said to emerge only in the face of the challenges presented in a particular 
domain, clearly the most effective methodological approach is likely to be the analysis of 
individual case-studies which exhibit identifiable choices being made between competing 
attachments.  The danger of course, anticipated by Geertz, is that of becoming immersed 
in the detail of a particular episode with little capacity for drawing general conclusions 
from it.  One way to overcome this problem might be to investigate not just the popular 
loyalties to other peoples indicated by a particular episode, but also the loyalties to 
institutions which are implied.  For the willingness to seek solutions to a particular 
problem within a certain institutional context is likely to indicate normative standpoints 
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which are more enduring than the episode itself (though naturally any particular episode 
may well have consequences for longer-term popular attitudes in the domain). 
 In an age of globalisation, the loyalties of EU citizens towards institutions are 
likely to be complex.  Today’s ‘displaced citizens’ are likely to make appeal to different 
institutions in different contexts – sometimes to national governments, sometimes to EU-
or regional-level governance, in other situations to institutions which do not 
conventionally form part of the political sphere – to NGOs and social movements, or to 
value structures such as religion and universal human rights.  As  Zygmunt Bauman 
writes in Modernity and Ambivalence, the individual ‘cannot be fully subsumed under 
any of the numerous subsystems which only in their combination constitute the fullness 
of his life process.’12  In the context of this paper however, and at risk of over-
simplification, it is on loyalties to national and European political institutions that we 
shall focus, given that these are likely to be most relevant to the future development of 
the Union. 
If our concern when investigating normative domains of loyalty is with the 
institutional context in which people are willing to tackle problems, it seems reasonable 
to attach significance to the following question: in what policy areas should power be 
delegated to the EU institutions so that they are competent to act independently of, or at 
least in conjunction with, the member-state governments?
13
  If, for example, people 
advocate immigration policy being conducted at an EU level, it would seem that they are 
implicitly stating that the national (or subnational) group to which they belong does not 
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claim favoured treatment over its neighbours, that the relevant issues should be dealt with 
in an impartial manner at the supranational level so that common supranational solutions 
may be found.  This acceptance of impartial treatment as opposed to preferential is what 
signifies the acceptance of a wider set of normative attachments – and, importantly, also 
the belief that other groups reciprocate these.  
Of course, this method of analysis may be unable to discern every domain of 
loyalty, since, as suggested above, it will not always be the case that people seek 
governmental expression for their normative attachments (they may place more emphasis 
on the capabilities of NGOs than on either national or EU-level government).  The 
answers to this test question should therefore be treated primarily as an aid to establishing 
well-founded hypotheses about the distribution of normative domains.  A different 
criticism might be that this approach is likely to overestimate popular loyalties – that 
willingness to see a policy conducted at EU-level may be the result either of indifference 
or a sense of pragmatism.  To this one might respond that indifference would itself seem 
to be significant (if an individual ‘couldn’t care less’ where a policy is conducted then he 
is implying the absence of exclusive loyalties), whilst the idea that an individual might 
advocate EU-level policy-making as the most effective way of protecting his national 
group (i.e. as a result of the very fact that his loyalties do not cross borders) would 
require a very strictly rational-actor model of popular attitudes.  It would seem reasonable 
to assume that whilst belief in added policy effectiveness may be a necessary condition of 
calls for EU-level action, it is not a sufficient one.  Acceptance of a common European 
foreign policy, for example, requires a belief that it can work, but also a belief that the 
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interests of all European citizens are intertwined. The normative judgement, in other 
words, is crucial.  
 
Which, then, are the predicaments for which people advocate EU-level action, and which 
are those for which they are reluctant to see it?  The OPTEM qualitative study cited 
above examines the expectations of the EU held by populations in the member states and 
nine of the candidate countries and divides the policy issues according to how much EU 
involvement is desired.  The areas of policy most commonly cited across all the 
populations as requiring EU-level action are these: health and consumer protection, 
environmental protection, and the fight against crime and trafficking.  In each, the study 
reports, it is expected that there be common rules and controls, and joint action at the 
global level.
14
  A series of fields that are ‘frequently cited’ as requiring EU-level action 
include social legislation (mainly workers’ rights) and immigration control.  Although a 
certain reluctance is expressed in some Scandinavian countries on the question of 
legislative harmonisation, this can be attributed to a fear of falling standards (i.e. to a 
pragmatic rather than to a normative concern).  By contrast, in competition policy EU 
involvement is treated considerably less favourably (regarded most often as exposing 
local businesses and employees to unwelcome transborder economic forces).   
The study also suggests that certain normative domains are more developed in 
some regions of Europe than in others.  For example, in the accession countries there 
tends to be particular emphasis put on labour mobility and the free movement of peoples, 
also on the mutual recognition of qualifications.
15
  Those countries affected heavily by 
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illegal migration (such as Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and Austria) tend to want 
increased EU-level activity in this field.  And furthermore, comparison with other studies 
indicates that priorities may change in response to events: in a Eurobarometer poll 
conducted at the beginning of 2002 (i.e. in the months following the attacks of September 
11
th), ‘maintaining peace and security in Europe’ was cited as the highest priority.16 
 These are all findings which are consistent with the idea that interest in 
supranational decision-making is inspired by transnational loyalties.  Desire for common 
rules in some areas does suggest acceptance of the existence of a predicament before 
which all are fundamentally equal (albeit some, as in the case of illegal immigration, may 
be more affected than others).  Reluctance to see further integration in competition policy 
suggests that in the macro-economic sphere there remains a desire to protect local 
interests even at the expense of overall economic productivity (i.e. that loyalties are 
rather narrower here).  Likewise, that labour mobility is regarded more favourably 
amongst some populations than amongst others is logical: populations in the established 
member states, as the ones most likely to face increased competition from outside as a 
result, are naturally likely to be more wary on such a matter and less willing to view their 
potential competitors as equals.  Those who expect their own populations to benefit will 
be more enthusiastic about greater freedom of movement – although here too the loyalties 
to certain groups are stronger than to others: Czech attitudes towards immigrants from the 
EU and towards Slovaks from the Slovak Republic tend to be considerably more positive 
than towards Slovak Roma and those from the former Soviet Union.
17
  Meanwhile, the 
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increased emphasis placed on the EU as a guarantor of security in the months after 
September 11
th
 also suggests an increased sense of solidarity in the face of a newly 
apparent threat from outside. 
 Given the discrepancies these findings indicate between popular willingness to be 
governed supranationally in some policy fields and not others, the shift in focus from 
overarching identities to issue-specific loyalties seems justified.  ‘Europeanness’ does 
seem dependent upon the issue at hand.  To understand in more detail how and why these 
normative domains evolve over time will require the investigation of case-studies.  The 
two domains that are chosen here are those of the environment and justice – the first 
being ostensibly one of the most developed areas of transnational loyalty in the EU, the 
second being one of the areas in which it has traditionally been difficult to overcome 
public hostility to EU-level policy-making. 
 
The Environmental Domain 
Last summer 260 tons of mercury were spilt at the chemical factory Spolana Neratovice, 
25km north of Prague, when the Elbe overflowed its banks during the heavy floods that 
hit Central Europe.  Such an incident was naturally likely to provoke some kind of 
international reaction: for the Germans living downstream in Saxony there would be clear 
environmental implications, and one could expect the local newspapers there to take a 
strong interest in the story.  What was perhaps less predictable was the degree of attention 
received further afield.  National German publications such as Spiegel, Focus, Die 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Berliner Zeitung and 
 14 
Tageszeitung all covered the story, as did a wide range of west-European newspapers.  
Jan Haverkamp, Campaign Director for Greenpeace in the Czech Republic, recalls that: 
 
‘During the flood we had contact with a very large group of international media … French, 
German, British (The Independent, The Times) and Dutch media – NRC Handelsblad, but also 
TROUW wrote extensively about Spolana and the flood as did several Dutch weeklies. Besides 
that it was featured three times at least (with a live interview with me) in the Dutch radio 
programme “Vroege Vogels” (Early Birds), which has one of the highest amounts of listeners 
(very extraordinary for a programme about nature and environment on Sunday morning!). Then 
there were several TV interviews as well in the very famous Jeugdjournaal (Youth News) and 
main news… I had one interview with the Spanish El Pais also.’18 
 
 
The significance of this press coverage is highlighted by an anecdote that Haverkamp 
tells: ‘when the Dutch Dance Theatre III (NDT III) came to Prague to play at the Divadlo 
na Vinohradech on 22 November 2002, they declared that all the proceeds of the 
performance would go to the “chemical victims of the flood”, i.e. that they were would be 
spent on the repairs of the culture houses in Mělnik and Neratovice.’19  That these brief-
stay visitors should be aware of the damage caused by the flood and of its cultural 
significance, indeed that they should be aware of the Spolana incident at all, is, argues 
Haverkamp, testament to the transborder loyalties which are emerging in today’s Europe 
in the environmental domain. 
 These loyalties do not, it is true, translate into unambiguous support for EU-wide 
environmental action directed from Brussels.  A recent Eurobarometer poll suggests that 
popular ‘trust’ in the EU is not high (only 13%, compared to 48% for environmental 
protection associations, 35% for scientists, 23% for consumer associations and other 
citizens’ organisations, 18% for television, 12% for national governments, 9% for 
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newspapers, 1% for business).
20
  But when it comes to decision-making, it is still the EU 
which is generally seen as the optimal instrument for action: 33% say the EU is ‘the best 
level for taking decisions about protecting the environment’, compared to 30% for 
national government, 27% for local government, and interestingly only 21% for the UN 
(emphasising the European rather than global character of the domain).
21
  People may 
trust NGOs, but only 24% of respondents recommend giving them a greater say in 
decision-making.
22
   
 The popularity of the Green Party in European Parliamentary elections is a further 
indication of the extent to which the EU populations treat environmental protection as a 
common predicament in which their fortunes cannot be separated.  The mean vote across 
the EU member-states for the Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary elections was 
7.4%, notably higher than the 4.4% mean vote for national Green parties in national 
elections in the period 1999-2003.
23
  This translates into healthy representation at the EU 
level: the Greens’ total of 38 MEPs out of 626 (6.1%) compares favourably with the 
mean level of representation in member-state national parliaments (5.0%).
24
  In the 
current European Parliament, only Spain, Portugal, Greece and Denmark are without 
Green representation.  A similarly strong degree of support can be expected in the new 
member states after 2004: Haverkamp argues that if the Green movement in the Czech 
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 16 
Republic organises itself successfully over the coming months it can claim perhaps two 
out of the 24 Czech seats in the European Parliament.  Votes are likely to come not only 
from traditionally polluted areas such as North Bohemia but also from relatively 
prosperous urban districts such as Karlovy Vary and Brno, suggesting an increasingly 
‘post-materialist’ support base which takes an explicitly normative stance on 
environmental issues rather than viewing these simply as another dimension of their 
personal well-being.
25
 
 In the OPTEM study mentioned above it is reported that ‘everyone understands 
that this [environmental protection] is a problem that goes beyond the national level and 
requires resolute joint action.’26 Even so, the success of the Greens at EU-level is often 
attributed to people’s supposed willingness to take a more idealistic stance when they 
perceive the stakes to be lower: elections to a parliament that has no direct tax-raising 
powers probably invite rather less circumspection than elections to national assemblies.  
But just as important is surely the experience of specific problems which have raised 
environmental issues up the agenda: as the study states, ‘citizens’ feelings have changed 
radically in all countries in recent years.  The new-found awareness of the fact of climate 
change has been a major factor in this together with issues germane to public health such 
as the BSE crisis, the increasingly controversial debate over GMOs etc.’27  It may be hard 
to imagine the Green Party extending its European Parliamentary powers dramatically in 
the future, given that when Green ideas start to gain currency they tend to be incorporated 
into the programmes of other parties, thereby depriving the Party of the most solid 
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elements of its campaign platform.  Nonetheless, this serves merely to underline that, in 
the right forum, the green vote is one that political parties cannot afford not to chase, and 
thus that the transnational loyalties engendered by the predicaments of environmental 
protection are an important component of the way EU citizens regard the Union’s 
purpose. 
 
So far it may appear that environmental issues tend to draw people together, that 
the normative discourse in this domain is increasingly well-established and inclusive.  
This, however, would be a simplification.  The challenges of environmental security can 
narrow loyalties as well as enlarge them.  One example of this may be found in the 
negative attitudes towards the Czech Republic engendered by the dispute over the 
Temelín nuclear reactor that began operation in 2001. 
 Situated ninety miles to the south of Prague, thirty miles north of Austria and 
thirty-eight miles east of Germany, the power-plant is in a provocative location.  Its 
combination of western and Soviet technology has made it an easy target for portrayal in 
the west as an engineering relic, ‘another Chernobyl waiting to happen’.  The handling of 
the Czech government has also done little to ease international concerns: as the scholar 
Regina Axelrod argues,  
 
‘The public has been unable to challenge government pronouncements about safety at the Temelín 
plant....  Public activity is considered an impediment to decisions...  Even the parliament never 
debated the decision to complete Temelín...  Local authorities’ opinions were not considered.  The 
decision to grant a construction licence was approved by the state office, which evaluated only the 
building plans and not the environmental impact of the plant.’28 
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Over the course of several months, an Austrian opposition alliance emerged composed of 
political groups (notably Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party), NGOs (in particular the Upper 
Austrian Anti-Nuclear Movement) and newspapers (most prominently the tabloid Die 
Kronenzeitung).  These sought vigorously to raise popular opposition to the nuclear 
reactor, culminating in a petition in January 2002 in which 915,220 Austrians (a sixth of 
those eligible) signed a petition calling for Czech entry to the EU to be dependent upon 
the closure of the plant.  Actual levels of opposition to the reactor are likely to have been 
near-universal – as the Viennese Mayor Michael Haeupl pointed out, many did not sign 
the petition because ‘they recognised that this petition drive was not about preventing 
Temelín but preventing Czech entry into the EU.’29  The slogan “Temelín is unnecessary, 
Temelín is uneconomical, Temelín is unsafe” is to be found on most streets leading into 
Austria from the South Bohemian border. 
 Was this degree of opposition due purely to environmental concerns, or was the 
nuclear-reactor issue merely an opportunity for deeper hostilities to be unveiled towards 
the Czechs?  It is clearly a crucial question in the context of this study: if the issue were 
merely a pretext for confrontation then one would be justified in reverting to the 
horizontal mode of analysis, in emphasising that the overarching perspective is prior to 
the event interpreted.  If, on the other hand, it is the issue itself which leads the discourse, 
then the emphasis on domain-based loyalties would be more appropriate.  Loyalties in 
one domain (environmental security) would be seen as affecting loyalties more generally, 
constitutive of any overarching outlook rather than dependent upon it. 
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 It is clear that more than one issue was at stake in Austrian public opposition to 
Temelín.  There were economic issues (fears of a distortion of the Central European 
energy market due to a sudden surplus of power generated by the reactor), there was the 
background of other disputes between the two populations (hostility regarding the Beneš 
decrees was at its peak in this period), there were also what one might refer to as a series 
of ‘rhetorical aggravations’ (Czech Premier Miloš Zeman subsequently referred to Haider 
as a ‘populist pro-Nazi’ and suggested that only idiots would sign the petition, something 
which the commentator Robert Schuster concedes may in itself have added around 
100,000 names to the list
30).  It is clear also that the general ‘sense of belonging’ between 
populations discussed above is relevant here: Haverkamp acknowledges that ‘there is a 
considerable amount of Austrians that look at Temelín with a foreign-unfriendly look - 
Temelín is bad because it is East.’31  There is, in other words, a ‘horizontal’ dimension to 
the episode. 
Nonetheless, the consensus seems to be that environmental concerns were the 
crucial element in the dispute, whether in the form of a direct assessment of Temelín 
itself or, perhaps more commonly, with reference to historical experience of the 
environmental implications of nuclear power.  Axelrod makes clear that ‘the debate 
moved to the international level when the Temelín opposition raised issues of safety and 
environment,’32 whilst Schuster estimates that at least 70-80% of those signing the 
petition did so specifically to oppose nuclear power.
33
  Haverkamp likewise emphasises 
that ‘the fact that the petition got so much support was because of genuine fears about 
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Temelín. Only on an FPOe [Freedom Party] ticket it would not have gotten the necessary 
100,000 votes at all. People did not receive it as an FPOe referendum, unfortunately...’34  
Debate over the safety of nuclear power has been part of public discourse in Austria for a 
long time – a referendum was held on the subject in 1978, resulting in the abandonment 
of the country’s only nuclear power-plant.  Haverkamp also reminds that ‘Chernobyl has 
been a traumatic experience for Austria - it increased the opposition against nuclear 
power from somewhere in the 70s to the high 90 percents.’35  Without the resonance of 
this comparison it is hard to imagine the Temelín issue becoming such a crucial 
normative issue in Austro-Czech relations. 
 From this brief analysis and from our investigation of the environmental domain 
generally one can draw the following conclusions.  Firstly, to repeat, it seems fair to say 
that it is the normative discourse in the particular domain, rather than abstract feelings of 
‘identity’, which are the key to understanding popular feelings of solidarity here, whether 
in the positive sense (Spolana) or the negative sense (Temelín).  Secondly, whilst it is 
true that the environmental domain is one in which transnational loyalties are generally 
well-developed, there is no unidirectional expansion of loyalties here.  Individual 
episodes can be strongly divisive.  Thirdly, it can be suggested that these normative 
domains should not be considered in isolation: in the case of the Temelín episode, 
conflict in the environmental domain can be said to have contributed to weakened 
loyalties in other domains such as the socio-economic.  To the extent that the issue may 
be said to have increased Austrian popular scepticism towards Czech membership of the 
European Union, it increased unwillingness to extend the socio-economic benefits of 
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membership to the citizens of another country.  Transnational solidarity as a whole was 
weakened. 
  
The Judicial Domain 
Our second case-study looks at Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),  the policy area in which 
EU integration is currently moving fastest.  Since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, several 
competences have been transferred to the EU-level, accelerated recently following the 
events of September 11
th
 2001 as politicians and members of the Commission seek to peg 
a range of policies to general concerns about security.
36
  Nonetheless, it is also an area 
where governments and populations have been traditionally unwilling to see sovereignty 
pooled to any substantial degree.  It is a domain in which normative issues are to the fore 
– how far are citizens in one country willing to trust judicial systems beyond their 
borders, whether in other EU member states or at the European level?  And yet the 
normative significance of the challenge faced – ensuring respect for the rule of law – may 
be quite different from that of maintaining environmental security.  By examining an 
incident that received a high level of public interest in Britain in the winter of 2001/2 it 
should be possible to reach some understanding of how loyalties are evolving in this 
domain and what the effect of individual episodes can be. 
 
 In early November 2001, eleven British men and one woman were arrested at a 
military airbase in Kalamata, Greece, on charges of spying.  The group claimed, 
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plausibly, that they were in fact ‘planespotters’, who by recording the details of military 
aircraft were merely pursuing a hobby.  Less common as a pursuit than ‘trainspotting’, 
planespotting was nonetheless a familiar enough activity for the British press to cast this 
group as a kind of national mascot; when the Greek authorities insisted on processing the 
arrested in the usual judicial manner, retaining them in custody for a period of several 
weeks, the response of the British press ranged from that of irritation that the Greek 
judicial system could be so inflexible to that of fundamental doubt about the viability of a 
European Union containing such a perceived gulf in institutional standards and cultural 
understanding.  How was it possible to take Tony Blair seriously when he argued that 
Britain’s ‘true destiny’ lay with partners such as these?37  The Daily Mail newspaper 
culminated its coverage by running a campaign to boycott Greek goods.  Feta cheese was 
targeted.  Holidays to Athens were presented as a health hazard: ‘if the muggers don’t get 
you, the heat may well do.’38 
 One of the reasons this makes a useful case-study of British attitudes is the extent 
to which the reaction diverged from the facts of the case.  The planespotters were clearly 
breaking Greek law by taking photographs at the airbase, and it seems fairly evident that 
they were aware of this: an earlier message on the Touchdown Tours website (the 
company which organised the trip) written by Paul Coppin, the group leader, made a 
telling reference to a previous trip: ‘I would warn that spotting in Greece is still not 
particularly liked by the authorities and without our contacts at the Greek Ministry of 
Defence, which helped on a number of occasions, the trip might have been a little longer 
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than anticipated!’39  In the light of Greece’s ongoing security concerns vis-à-vis Turkey, 
and in the light of heightened military sensitivity post-September 11
th
, the immediate 
response of the Greeks could hardly have been surprising, and so British support for the 
planespotters need hardly have been automatic.  Likewise, as the episode unfolded, there 
was no genuine reason to expect the Greek government to intervene in the Greek judicial 
process, however controversial the case.  There is also reason to suppose that the prison 
conditions in which the group was held were not quite as unfavourable as frequently 
described.
40
 
 If the reaction of the British press was rather distorted then, one naturally might 
ask why this should be.  At first glance the episode seems to fit most neatly with a 
conventional horizontal-type analysis: a generally Eurosceptic country was taking a 
welcome opportunity to enjoy a little xenophobia.  How could we British be so 
misunderstood? – ‘a dozen middle-aged eccentrics set off to pursue their hobby ... they 
end up where they shouldn’t be ... police intervene, convinced they have stumbled on a 
nest of spies .. these could be ingredients for one of those old Ealing comedies.’41  ‘One 
can forgive the Greeks for a certain initial mystification.  What one cannot forgive, three 
weeks later, when the quaint English habit of plane-spotting has been explained, is the 
way our harmless nerds have been treated.’42  Nor was it only the right-wing Eurosceptic 
press that was tempted to philosophise: The Guardian felt that ‘a cultural gulf seems to 
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lie at the heart of the detention of 12 British planespotters in Greece ... There are, it 
seems, some things that EU harmonisation can never reconcile.’43 
Whilst this sense of cultural gap is certainly of significance, it is worth 
remembering at the outset that newspaper discourse is likely to exaggerate it.  Firstly it 
provides a convenient way of framing the story so as to make it meaningful to the reader 
– the fate of twelve planespotters was not ‘pure news’ in the way that an accident or a 
military conflict might be, it required a narrative to go with it.  Secondly, newspapers 
usually seek coherence of message.  Unlike citizens, whose attitudes, we have argued, 
tend to vary according to particular issues, newspapers are likely to have a political or 
ideological stance from which they derive, far more deductively, their views on particular 
issues.  Their approach is a deliberately horizontal one.  In this case, those newspapers 
that took the greatest interest in the story (the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph) were 
right-wing newspapers seeking to make use of it to justify their own Eurosceptic 
positions.  To understand where popular loyalties lie on the issue certainly requires 
studying newspaper discourse, since this largely sets the terms of the debate, but it also 
requires looking beyond the superficial coherence which is deliberately sought by 
newspaper editors. 
 Considering first the newspaper discourse itself, the case of the planespotters 
illustrates how one particular episode can have consequences for a range of separate 
issues within the domain.  Several of the newspapers link the issue of mutual recognition 
of jurisdictions thrown up by the planespotters case to another JHA issue that was under 
discussion at the time, the European Arrest Warrant, by which any EU citizen might be 
arrested, extradited or held in custody in any other EU country, whether or not the 
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offences were considered a crime in the host country. The Telegraph makes the link, as 
does The Times – despite the fact that there was no direct connection to the planespotters 
(who, arrested in Greece, would not have needed to be extradited).
44
  The Daily Mail 
makes the connection most dramatically: ‘there are wider issues in this perversion of 
justice [the planespotters case]. At this moment, Britain and the rest of the EU are 
cooperating as never before on matters of law, the courts and extradition.  In future, any 
British citizen could be hauled off to stand trial in Greece, on an arrest warrant issued in 
that country.  But who in his senses would trust the Greek courts now?’45 The climax 
comes during the Laeken summit, when the Mail’s front-page headline reads: ‘Surrender: 
Yesterday Britain gave up 1000 years of legal sovereignty to Europe’s judges and police’, 
with the text continuing ‘critics point to Greece – the country that has held 12 British 
planespotters in jail for more than a month on questionable spying charges – as an 
example of the legal systems to which the Government is handing unprecedented powers 
over Britons.’46  The Conservative MP David Cameron emphasises a week later in The 
Guardian the impact that the planespotters case has had on discussion of the Arrest 
Warrant: ‘what might have been a side issue, of interest only to the eurosceptic wing of 
the Conservative party … has become a matter of national debate.’47  The single high-
profile case seems to have an immediate effect on levels of trust generally in non-British 
justice. 
 It also leads to renewed discussion, in the Eurosceptic press at least, about the 
extent to which Britain should be involved in a Union with countries such as Greece at 
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all: ‘what is even more shocking about this situation,’ believes the Daily Mail, ‘is that it 
has taken place in Greece, a supposedly modern democracy that is not only a member of 
the European Union but is apparently fit to join the single currency.  When Tony Blair 
said earlier this week that our ‘true destiny’ lies as a full partner in a united Europe, he 
means that we will be sharing our sovereignty, our money and our army with countries 
such as Greece.  Does Greece deserve such trust?  Its actions in locking up these plane 
spotters suggest a mentality more akin to a paranoid African dictatorship...’48  
 However, for all the talk of ‘cultural gaps’ and disdain for Greek judicial 
standards, even the Daily Mail itself, which seeks a consistently Eurosceptic message, 
resists simple classification as ‘anti-European’.  On the same page that it sardonically 
concludes a Comment section on the planespotters case with the words ‘welcome to the 
brave new Europe, where Mr. Blair says our ‘true destiny’ lies’, one finds it seeking EU-
level solutions to the upheaval in Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: ‘so far the European 
Union has contemplated sanctions ... but has been reluctant to employ them.  It must 
think again.  They might not finish him off, but they would sting him and, no less 
important, show the Zimbabwean people, black and white, that we were at least doing 
something.’49  Noticeable, meanwhile, in its coverage of the planespotters case is the 
interest it takes in the views and actions of MEPs.  Several are repeatedly quoted, in 
particular Conservative MEP Geoffrey Van Orden
50
 and Labour MEP Richard Howitt,
51
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though also Conservative MEP Timothy Kirkhope.
52
  The style in which they are 
presented suggests one should not write this off simply as hungry journalists relying on 
rent-a-quote politicians: Richard Howitt comes to be presented as something of a 
crusader (‘Labour Euro MP Richard Howitt was flying to Athens last night for a face-to-
face meeting with some of the prisoners.  He plans to challenge the authorities to either 
charge the 12 Britons or let them go;’53 likewise ‘Mr. Howitt is pressing for the 
intervention of the European Court of Human Rights over their conditions and treatment 
... “European law states that people are innocent until proven guilty, not guilty until 
proven innocent as appears to be the case here.  I shall be raising the matter with the 
European Parliament.  I shall be pressing for the case to be taken to the European Court 
of Human Rights.”’54)  The Daily Mail’s views are, one might say, paradoxical: whilst 
the ‘idea’ of the EU is habitually ridiculed, its mechanisms are accorded some value. 
If this complexity can be true of a consciously Eurosceptic newspaper, it is likely 
to be even more true of citizens themselves.  Consider the conduct of two of the 
planespotters: after their acquittal Paul and Lesley Coppin decide to travel with their 
MEP Richard Howitt to Strasbourg to discuss their experiences with various MEPs and 
with Antonio Vittorino, the Commissioner for JHA.
55
  The statements which they release 
are interesting: ‘This case has brought home to us that different countries throughout the 
European Union do not have common standards,’ says Mrs. Coppin.  ‘We want a level 
playing field with common rules throughout the continent.’56  ‘Without the intervention 
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of the European Parliament, we would have been in prison for longer, meaning the loss of 
our jobs, homes and the destruction of our lives.  Now Euro MPs must support the new 
EU legislation – we can do no more.’57  Mr. Coppin’s line is similar: preparing for the 
meeting, he says ‘we will be doing a bit of lobbying about common judicial standards and 
the different systems across Europe.  We will see how it all works and keep up the 
campaigning so this doesn’t happen to anyone else.’58  Then, the next day: ‘I very much 
welcome that Europe is recognising the wider implications of our case, and that new 
European law will guarantee that what we experienced should never happen to anyone 
else.’59  The message in each of these statements seems to be this: the need to bring the 
realities of the EU in line with expectations, to ensure that common EU standards are 
upheld.  Thus, though one might initially assume that the case weakens enthusiasm for 
non-British justice (weakens transnational loyalties in this domain, in other words), those 
at the very centre of the affair seem to be seeking equality with their fellow EU citizens 
under common rules (so long as these work effectively) and, more generally, seem to 
regard themselves, the European Parliament, the Commission and its representatives as 
meaningful components of a wider political space.
60
 
 
 This analysis of the judicial domain points to a number of conclusions.  Firstly, 
despite this last point, it does seem clear that transnational loyalties are less developed 
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here than in the environmental domain.  There is an instinctive scepticism towards all 
forms of foreign justice – perhaps more so than average in Britain, given the country’s 
high regard for its own common law system.  As in the environmental domain, the 
development of individual episodes can have significant normative consequences, both 
within the domain (concern about another proposed feature of JHA, the Arrest Warrant) 
and beyond it (renewed doubt generally about Britain’s ability to coexist with countries 
perceived to have quite different institutional standards and cultural norms).  And as with 
the environmental domain, the case-study indicates the extent to which discussion of 
monolithic identities is problematic: the Daily Mail’s position is more ambiguous than it 
seems, whilst that of the planespotters, contemptuous of the Greek judicial system, 
nonetheless cannot fairly be described as ‘anti-European’ since they are willing to invest 
time in seeking EU-level solutions.   
 
Normative Domains and the Future of Europe 
It has been the argument of this paper that popular loyalties (and their absence) towards 
institutions and peoples are best considered according to issue-area – the vertical 
approach – rather than presented in such broad and decontextualised categories as 
‘European identity’, ‘national identity’ etc – this being referred to as the horizontal 
approach.  Loyalties in each ‘domain’ of activity have been regarded as evolving 
gradually and somewhat incoherently, guided by the transnational challenges articulated 
in the domain, and with implications for loyalties outside the domain.  Scepticism has 
been expressed, on the basis of a brief study of the environmental domain, regarding the 
idea of a unidirectional process of widening loyalties. 
 30 
 As suggested in the introduction, this discussion has some implications for the 
events which are currently taking place in Brussels.  There is much talk of a deficit of 
legitimacy in the EU.  Whilst the problem may perhaps better be reframed as a that of a 
deficit of popular consent,
61
 the need to engender a greater collective sense of popular 
solidarity across borders is the same.
62
  It is the creation of a Community, as defined at 
the beginning of this paper (where loyalties in different domains are consistently pan-
European in breadth), which is felt to be the key to making the EU a meaningful political 
space.  The kind of issue-based politics pursued by MEPs in the European Parliament 
needs to be replicated across the European populations at large, something for which 
popular loyalties will need to be commensurate with the size of the decision-making 
sphere.  How normative discourse is evolving in the various domains of EU activity is 
clearly therefore one of the crucial indicators of the viability of the integration process. 
 And yet the approach being taken at the Convention on the Future of the EU is, as 
we have said, the horizontal one: a Constitutional Treaty has been drafted which seeks to 
bundle popular loyalties into a single package of national identity and European values.  
The structures are being designed with a view to creating symbolic unity rather than 
reflecting multiple affiliation (consider, for instance, the proposal for a long-term elected 
President of the European Council
63
).  Whilst observation suggests that transnational 
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loyalties emerge (or retreat) as a result of the normative impact of individual episodes in 
individual domains of activity, the current process of institutional reform appears to be an 
attempt to win them wholesale.   
 Such a project is grounded in good intentions. The mechanisms and competences 
of the Union require clarification.  There is a need for such a ‘reference guide’ to the 
Union.  Conceivably indeed, the result may be the very thing which frees us from the 
horizontal approach: by defining the role and the goals of the EU with some finality, one 
could envisage an end to barren debate of the ‘pro-EU’ / ‘anti-EU’ kind in countries such 
as Britain, Ireland, Denmark and some of the accession countries, replaced instead by the 
very issue-based politics that might encourage normative discourse in the various 
domains to coalesce in the form of a Community.  Unfortunately this does seem to be an 
implausible hope however – current experience in Britain suggests that the project may 
have the opposite effect of galvanising opposition to the Union.   
Ultimately what this discussion of transnational solidarity invites us to remember 
is that the final Convention document is to be a Constitutional Treaty, not a Constitution, 
with the implication that it should concern the relationships between actors rather than 
attempt to define and nurture the ‘identity’ of one of them in particular, the citizenry.  To 
expect the latter achievement from such a document would be to risk misunderstanding 
the nature of the Union – to mistake it for an emergent federal structure as opposed to the 
space in which a network of plural transnational loyalties continues to evolve.  
 
